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Recent Trends in Commercial Bank Lending to
LDCs: Part of the Problem or Part of the
Solution?
John E. Mendezt
The international financial system has changed dramatically over the
past ten years. Less developed countries' (LDCs) have experienced in-
creasing balance of payments deficits and continue to borrow quite
heavily from commercial banks2 to finance those deficits. The LDCs
and the commercial banks now are locked into a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship of unprecedented magnitude. Although until recently this re-
lationship played an important role as a buffer to world economic
crises and cycles and as a source of development capital, it now has
great potential for catastrophe.
The bank-LDC relationship, while for the most part harmonious
throughout the 1970's, now faces continual pressure from world events
such as persistently high interest rates, military interventions, and re-
cessionary cycles. This pressure has prompted the banks to adopt new
lending techniques to maintain profits and prevent default. To the ex-
tent that these techniques allow the banks and LDCs enough flexibility
to pursue their objectives, they help perpetuate the relationship. To the
extent, however, that these techniques compromise both groups' mu-
tual long-term interests, they add to the pressures already exerted by
world events and may hasten the relationship's demise.
This Article surveys some of the problems that LDCs have encoun-
tered in adjusting their economies to reduce or eliminate their balance
of payments deficits and describes the evolution of bank lending for
LDC deficit financing. It then analyzes some recent trends in banking
techniques used to reduce the risks involved with LDC lending. The
Article concludes by examining the likely effect of these trends on the
bank-LDC relationship and by suggesting some courses of action
designed to ensure its perpetuation.
t Associate, White & Case, New York, New York; Member of the New York Bar.
1. These countries include such relatively more developed nations as Mexico and Brazil,
as well as many less advanced countries around the world.
2. These are the private, non-governmental banks of different nations that have entered
the LDC lending market.
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I. The Growth in Commercial Bank Lending to LDCs
Over the past decade commercial banks have dramatically increased
their loans to LDCs. The predominant factor in the increase in LDCs'
demand for private loans has been the need to finance balance of pay-
ments deficits.
A. Balance of Payments Defcits and External Financing
A balance of payments deficit 3 generally indicates that a country, at
least temporarily, is living beyond its means by spending more for im-
ports than it earns from exports.4 This overextension may or may not
be due to forces within the country's control. For example, if an LDC
is experiencing a deficit because it is pursuing an overly ambitious de-
velopment program requiring increased imports, it can control the defi-
cit by slowing development.5 On the other hand, if the deficit is caused
by external economic forces, it is largely beyond the country's control.6
Countries can pursue three basic courses of economic action to cor-
rect a balance of payments deficit. First, they can attempt to limit
growth and the demand for imports.7 Second, they can attempt to in-
crease export earnings by stimulating growth and sales.8 Third, they
can postpone these difficult economic adjustments by financing the def-
icit through either the expenditure of finite reserves or external
borrowing. 9
3. The "balance of payments" is the status of a country's international accounts. These
international accounts are the balance of merchandise, Le., total exports of goods less total
imports, the balance of services (invisibles), the long-term capital account, and the short-
term capital account. H. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND PAYMENTS,
443-56 (1979). The purpose of monitoring these accounts is to determine a country's eco-
nomic position in the international community. Different corrective measures may be re-
quired by the overall position of a country's balance of payments. Id In general, a balance
of payments deficit in one country is matched by a corresponding net surplus in other coun-
tries. Id at 458.
4. H. GRAY, supra note 3, at 458.
5. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, NORTH-
SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 216 (1980) [hereinafter BRANDT REPORT].
6. BRANDT REPORT, supra note 5, at 216; P. DHONTE, CLOCKWORK DEBT, 41-42 (1979).
7. H. GRAY, supra note 3, at 464; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., INTERNATIONAL
DEBT, THE BANKS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 40 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter STAFF
REPORT].
8. H. GRAY, supra note 3, at 464; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 40.
9. H. GRAY, supra note 3, at 464; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 40.
Financing of balance of payments deficits is not the sole reason for LDC borrowing.
Other purposes may include development financing and the accumulation of foreign cur-
rency reserves. See G. ABBOTr, INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIS 166-71 (1979); J. EATON & M. GERSOVITZ, POOR-COUNTRY BORROWING IN
PRIVATE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE REPUDIATION ISSUE 8-9 (Princeton Studies in In-
ternational Finance No. 47, 1981); Solomon, Developing Nations and Commercial Banks:
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A country's ability to, correct for a deficit by pursuing import restric-
tions or export expansion depends upon a number of factors, including
its internal situation, the climate of the world economy, and the coun-
try's position in that economy. The country's internal situation is im-
portant in several regards. The strength or weakness of a country's
political structure determines the demands or restraints its government
can successfully impose on the populace.' 0 Its ability to satisfy the es-
sential needs of the populace without imports is another factor deter-
mining the degree to which the government can impose import
restrictions." Finally, the extent to which the country's economy de-
pends on imports to produce exports or enhance internal development
also determines the government's ability to pursue a policy of decreas-
ing imports while expanding exports.' 2
The climate of the world economy and the country's position in it
also determine the country's ability to pursue corrective policies by dic-
tating the extent to -which it can affect the price and supply of its ex-
ports.' 3 Because LDCs' economies are at lower stages of development,
they are more vulnerable than developed countries to the external
forces which create deficits. 4 In addition, since LDCs' standards of liv-
ing are already comparatively low, and their export sales depend heav-
ily on demand in the developed countries, their ability to correct
deficits by reducing imports or expanding exports is limited.' 5
Thus, many of the major causes of balance of payments deficits in
LDCs are not within their control.' 6 Furthermore, LDCs are not situ-
ated equally with developed countries, or among themselves, to adopt
corrective policies for balance of payments deficits. 17 If economic ad-
justment cannot be made by decreasing imports or expanding exports,
The New Dependency, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325, 331 (1976); Adede, Loan Agreements
between Developing Countries and Foreign Commercial Banks-Rfections on Some Legal
and Economic Issues, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 235, 237 (1978).
10. A stable political structure is important because restraints on domestic consumption
and growth can lead to political unrest which may threaten the survival of the government
imposing the measures. STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 51; see infra note 35 and accompa-
nying text.
11. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
12. See G. ABBOTr, supra note 9, at 159, 165-66.
13. See, e.g., id at 159, 166;A U.S. Damper on WorldRecovery, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1981,
at 126.
14. See G. ABBoTT, supra note 9, at 159; see also A U.S. Damper on World Recovery,
supra note 13, at 126.
15. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 50-51.
16. One important such cause has been increased oil prices. Dod, Bank Lending to De-
veloping Countries, 67 FED. RESERVE BULL. 647, 648 (1981).
17. Dod, supra note 16, at 648; see P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 41-42.
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an LDC will be forced to finance its deficits. 18 If the cost of this financ-
ing is not within the LDC's present and future net export earnings, the
inevitable result will be that its development resources, ie., its future
income-generating capital base, will be diverted to satisfy short-term
needs. 19 This diversion in turn will reduce future export earnings, and
can contribute to a perpetual balance of payments deficit.20
B. Commercial Bank Lendingfor LDC Deficit Financing
Prior to 1973 commercial banks played a limited role in LDC lend-
ing. Most credit came from public sources such as the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, from bilateral government loans, or from the sale of gov-
ernment bonds.2 ' After the 1973 oil embargo, however, the huge in-
crease in oil prices revolutionized the relationship between the banks
and the LDCs.
The oil price increase created massive surpluses which the OPEC
countries deposited in the commercial banks.2 2 The banks in turn
sought outlets for these deposits at a time when corporate borrowing
had been weakened by the depressed economy.23 They turned to the
only borrowers willing to take on massive amounts of loans-the
LDCs.24 At the same time, the oil price increase generated large defi-
cits in the LDCs which exceeded the funds available from public credi-
tors.25 The LDCs thus were eager to borrow from banks in order to
finance their deficits and supplement development capital.26
The bank-LDC relationship eased the impact of OPEC price in-
creases by recycling surpluses to LDCs with oil-related deficits. 27 The
18. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
19. See G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 159; see also J. MATHIESON, INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCIAL ISSUES 2 (Overseas Development Council, Background Paper for the Cancun
Summit No. 4, Sept. 1981).
20. See G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 166.
21. See Dod, supra note 16, at 647 (foreign official lenders).
22. Solomon, supra note 9, at 332.
23. Id
24. Id at 331. Ir fact, LDCs had begun borrowing from banks during the late 1960's
and early 1970's, when they enjoyed sustained growth and increased prices for their exports.
This gave them favorable credit ratings and easy access to bank loans. In addition, changes
in developed countries' regulation of corporate borrowing, together with increased govern-
ment guarantees of LDC loans, helped create a favorable climate for LDC borrowing. Solo-
mon, supra note 9, at 330-3 1; Dod, supra note 16, at 649-50; Aronson, Financial.Institutlons in
the International Monetary System, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 341, 351-52 (1980).
25. See Solomon, supra note 9, at 331.
26. Solomon, supra note 9, at 330-32; Dod, supra note 15, at 650; see STAFF REPORT,
supra note 6, at 43-47; Bossing the Markets, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1983, at 9 (editorial).
27. See Goodman & Worth, The Future of Commercial Banks in LDC Financing, BANK-
ERS MAG. (Boston), Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 78, 79; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
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conditions favoring the development of this relationship led the banks
and LDCs to overestimate the long-term compatibility of their objec-
tives, however. The LDCs' payment imbalances were thought to be
temporary; as a result, difficult policy adjustments to restrict growth
and domestic consumption were not made.28 Over the decade, this be-
lief proved false as the world economy deteriorated and LDCs exper-
ienced increasing deficits. The amount of credit required by LDCs has
increased and few loans have been repaid without further borrowing.29
In the succeeding years LDCs have had limited success in imple-
menting corrective policies to reduce their dependence on external
financing. LDCs such as Poland,30 Nicaragua,31 and Zaire32 have ex-
perienced political turmoil leading to economic catastrophe and con-
tinue to depend on external financing. Other countries such as
Jamaica 33 and Rumania34 have not been able to expand exports or
limit the demand for or price of imports and also continue to rely on
financing. These latter countries could experience severe political un-
rest if reductions in imports were attempted.35 In addition, Rumania,
Hungary, and other COMECON countries are showing signs of pay-
ment problems and have suffered reduced credit.36
Political events also have played a major role in making certain LDC
borrowers unwelcome in the credit market. For example, the revolu-
28. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 49-51; P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 45; see Regan,
The United States and the World's Debt Problem, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 32, col. 3
(editorial by Treasury Sec. Donald T. Regan) [hereinafter Regan Statement].
29. Aronson, supra note 24, at 352; Dod, supra note 15, at 650, 653;.4 Nightmare ofDebt,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982, at Survey 22-27; see STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 57; P.
DHONTE, supra note 6, at xiii; Anderson, The Year of the Rescheduling, EUROMONEY, Aug.
1982, at 19, 21-22; Regan Statement, supra note 28. Estimates predicted that one of every
two dollars borrowed in 1980 would be used to service outstanding loans. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 7, at 51. If present conditions persist, it is estimated that by 1985 two of every
three dollars will be used for this purpose. Dizard, The End of Let's Pretend, FORTUNE,
Nov. 29, 1982, at 60, 78.
30. A Nightmare ofDebt, supra note 29, at Survey 10.
31. Id at Survey 28, 35.
32. Note, Procedural Guidelinesfor Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Re/orr Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305, 323-26 (1981).
33. Kincaid, Conditionality and the use offund resources, FIN. & DEv., June 1981, at 18
(IMF experience in Jamaica).
34. A System That Doesn't Work, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1982, at 36, 41; see U.S. Bids
Rumania Pay Overdue Grain Debt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at D1, col. 1; Rumania in
Talks with IMF, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1982, at Dl, col. 6.
35. The imposition of austerity measures has led to political unrest in similarly situated
countries. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 66-67 (Egypt and Peru).
36. See International Banking Systenr Communist Bloc Debt and World Banking Ten-
sion, 14 INT'L CURRENcY REv., Mar. 1982, at 23; see also A System That Doesn't Work,
supra note 30, at 36.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
tion in Iran resulted in a declaration of default,3 7 and the war over the
Falklands between the United Kingdom and Argentina for a time
threatened to precipitate an Argentinian default.38
Other LDCs, such as Mexico and Brazil, in large part due to their
abundant resources and higher levels of development,39 were able to
service their debt without sacrificing development objectives. 40 In fact,
they continued to borrow throughout the 1970's to pursue ambitious
development programs.41 When the world economy began to deterio-
rate in 1979, however, and the demand for their exports decreased,
even Mexico and Brazil encountered serious difficulties in repaying
their external debt.42 The additional borrowings they undertook
throughout the 1970's have made these countries the largest debtors
among the LDCs. 43 Both are currently adjusting their economies to
reduce deficits and avoid default on their loans.44 A default by either
of these countries would have such widespread impact that it could
result in the collapse of the international financial system.45
Comparative figures illustrate the dramatic change in the bank-LDC
relationship that has occurred over the last decade. 46 The average cur-
rent account deficits of the non-OPEC LDCs grew from approximately
1.75% of their gross national product (GNP) in early 1973 to approxi-
mately 6% of their GNP in 1981. 47 The total long-term debt of LDCs
from public and private sources grew from $87 billion in 1971 to an
37. See THE IRAN CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (R. Steele ed. 1980) (bank re-
sponses to Iranian crisis); see also A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 25, at Survey 35.
38. Britain's Freeze Dismays Bankers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1982, at DI, col. 3; Bennett,
Argentine Debt in U.S.: A Worrisome $9 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1982, at DI, col. 1.
39. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 54.
40. "We Are in an Emergency," TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42.
41. See id; BRANDT REPORT, supra note 5, at 222. Some OPEC countries have pursued
similarly aggressive development programs. These programs were initially financed by oil
revenues, but when revenues declined, the programs were sustained in part by borrowings
from banks. Arab Countries, Hurt by Slack Oil Prices, Increase Loans from Commercial
Banks, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 30, col. 1 [hereinafter Arab Countries Increase Loans];
Banks Reduce Lending To The Third WorldAmid Rising Concern Over Debt Problems, Wall
St. J., Jan. 19, 1983, at 34, col. 2.
42. See The Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Dec. 20, 1982, at 46; "We Are in an Emergency,"
supra note 40, at 39-40.
43. See The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 42, at 43 (chart).
44. Mexico Proposes to Restructure Some of Its Debt, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 34,
col. I; Brazil's Biggest Bank Is Said to Get Bailout Credit in U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982,
at A1, col. 1; Robinson, The Endofthe Illusion in LatinAmerica, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1982, at
77, 86-87.
45. See The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 42, at 44; "We Are in an Emergency," supra
note 40, at 31.
46. These figures are intended only as a comparative measure. Estimates of LDC debt
and bank exposure generally have been inaccurate and unreliable. See infra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
47. Dod, supra note 15, at 647 (chart).
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estimated $524 billion in 1981.48 As of 1981 the LDCs owed approxi-
mately $90 billion to U.S. banks alone.49
While total lending to LDCs has increased greatly over the decade, it
has remained concentrated in the hands of a few LDC borrowers.50
For the most part, bank funds have been lent only to middle and higher
income LDCs, while the lower income LDCs still depend primarily on
public lenders for their external borrowing.51
In the 1980's, the world economy is once again in the process of
change. A worldwide glut has driven down oil prices and caused a
decrease in OPEC-generated funds which can be re-lent by banks to
LDCs.5 2 In fact, some OPEC countries have become net borrowers.5 3
Developed countries also have begun incurring large deficits, and have
been financing them by borrowing in the private market, thus adding to
the competition for bank funds.54 In addition, fears of LDC defaults
and the declining profitability of LDC lending have driven some banks
from the LDC market.55 In sum, bank loans for LDCs are now more
difficult to obtain and are available only on much less favorable terms.
Government regulators in developed countries are reevaluating bank
lending to LDCs out of fear of a potential collapse of the world
financial system.5 6 They believe that such a collapse could be brought
48.. A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 100 (chart). Other sources suggest a
figure of $540 billion. Madeley, Banks at the Brink, WORLD PREss REv., Apr. 1982, at 39.
49. Atkinson & Rowe, Problems in International Lending: Are U.S. Banks Headingfor
Trouble? Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1982, at G1, col. 3.
50. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 53-54.
51. For example, of the $456 billion of LDC debt outstanding in 1980, thirteen middle to
u per income LDCs had accumulated $271 billion, and the remaining $184 billion was dis-
tnbuted among 137 other LDCs. Atkinson & Rowe, supra note 49, at GI, col. 3. More than
$61 billion was concentrated in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile together accounting for more than $52 billion. Id at G2, cols.
2 & 4. See P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 18-23; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 53-55.
52. The oil glut has had mixed effects on the world economy. The cost of energy to oil
importing countries is significantly lower, which has helped reduce their need for external
borrowing. At the same time, however, lower revenues have reduced the OPEC surpluses
which banks recycle to LDCs. Farnsworth, Oil Price Drop Puts Squeeze On Lending to Poor
Nations, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, § 5, at 3, col. 1; Rattner, A Rosier Payments Outlook,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1982, at 31, col. 3.
53. Recycling OPEC's Deficit, EcoNoMisT, Feb. 20, 1982, at 84; Arab Countries Increase
Loans, supra note 41, at 30, col. 1; The Leverage ofLower Oil Prices, Bus. WK., Mar. 22,
1982, at 66, 69.
54. In Western Europe, Some Countries Owe Big Sums to Foreigners, Wall St. J., Dec. 14,
1982, at I, col. 6; Farnsworth, supra note 42, § 5, at 3, col. 1; see Solomon, supra note 5, at
361.
55. Ipsen, After Mexico, the Regionals are in Retreat, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1983, at 58;
Grant, he Stuffees Have Left, The Stuffers Remain, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1982, at 33; Witcher,
Small Bank in the South Comes to Regret Entry into Foreign Lending, Wall St. J., Mar. 25,
1983, at 1, col. 6, 15, col. 1.
56. See A Nightmare ofDebt, supra note 29, at Survey 89-94; Solomon, supra note 9, at
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on by wide-spread bank failures if any of the larger LDC borrowers
were to default.57 LDCs and banks are calling for public organizations
to take a larger role in the debt financing process as lenders, guaran-
tors, and supervisors.5 8
In addition, the number of renegotiations has increased as some
LDCs have been unable to meet their obligations.5 9 There are also
signs that banks may be more willing--or may be forced by their gov-
ernments-to declare LDCs in default as the issue becomes more
politicized.60
Conditions in the developed world continue to limit prospects for the
containment of LDC deficits. A major recession in the developed
countries has caused a decrease in the demand for LDCs' exports and
has depressed their price.6' In addition, some developed countries are
responding to the recession by imposing import restrictions which have
depressed further the demand for LDC exports.62
The efforts of the United States and other developed countries to
reduce inflation have added to LDCs' financial problems by causing
persistently high interest rates. This has strengthened the U.S. dollar
and depressed LDC currencies. 63 Since most LDC loans are denomi-
nated in dollars, the cost of servicing them has increased
339-41; P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 51-53; see also Silkenat, Eurodollar Borrowings by Devel-
oping States: Terms and Negotiating Problems, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 89, 92 n.16 (1979).
At the present time, proposals are being considered to increase regulation of U.S. banks'
international loans in order to prevent future crises and placate critics of the increase in IMF
contributions. The Reagan administration and Congress fear that acceptance of increased
IMF quotas without increased regulation of banks gives the impression of government "bail
out." At the same time, authorities are concerned that overly stringent regulations would
cause a sharp contraction in bank lending to LDCs and exacerbate the LDCs' liquidity
problems. Senators' Plan Urges Fed Be Given Power To Restrict U.S. Banks' Lending
Abroad, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 7, col. 2; U.S. Bankers Urge Increase In IMF Capital,
Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1983, at 26, col. 3; see generally Corse & Nichols, United States Govern-
ment Regulation of International Lending by-American Banks, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
LAW 85 (R. Rendell ed. 1980).
57. See A Nightmare ofDebt, supra note 29, at Survey 89, 92-94.
58. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 9, at 349.
59. Renegotiation describes situations in which the borrower cannot meet its obligations
under the loan agreement and renegotiates or supplements the terms of the original agree-
ment. Note, supra note 32, at 307 n.10;A Nightmare o/Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 22-27.
60. Atkinson & Rowe, supra note 49, at G2, col. 2.
61. While the recession and falling oil prices have had some positive effect on prices
LDCs pay for imports, the decline has not kept pace with the decline in prices LDCs receive
for their exports. See G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 158-66; A U.S. Damper on World Recov-
ery, supra note 13, at 126-28; Africa's Growing Pains, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1981, at 88;
Rattner, supra note 52, at 31, col. 3.
62. See 1982 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RE-
STUCTIONS 3-37 (IMF) [hereinafter 1982 IMF EXCHANGE REPORT]; see also Nowzad, Debt
in developing countries: some issuesfor the 1980, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1982, at 13, 14.
63. Dod, supra note 16, at 651;A U.S. Damper on WorldRecovery, supra note 13, at 126.
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correspondingly. 64
In sum, a number of factors have combined to create a situation of
increasing LDC balance of payment problems and decreasing bank
funds available to finance them. In addition, the funds that are avail-
able are considerably more costly. Finally, world recession has de-
creased the LDCs' ability to adjust for deficits by increasing exports,
while for some LDCs adjustments by reducing imports may not be po-
litically feasible. Thus, development funds are being diverted and
loans are being contracted on terms that LDCs are unlikely to be able
to meet.6
5
What once was considered a short-term imbalance is in fact a long-
term, structural problem which requires far-sighted solutions. Respon-
sible fiscal policies, including economic adjustment and prudent use of
private borrowing, must be pursued by LDCs if they are to survive
their mounting debt problems. At the same time, inflexibility on lend-
ing terms or an exodus of banks from the LDC lending market may
cause the collapse of this already unstable relationship.66
Banks, LDCs, public organizations, and governments all are seeking
to modify the relationship so that it not only will continue to provide
the LDCs needed credit, but also will reduce the risks banks presently
face. It is unclear whether these changes can be introduced in such a
way as to avoid the collapse of the present relationship.
II. Bank Techniques Used to Reduce Risk of LDC Lending
As a result of the increased pressures on the bank-LDC relationship,
banks have sought to change their lending techniques in order to re-
duce the risk involved in LDC lending. These changes have focused on
reducing the risk to individual lenders and on minimizing the possibil-
ity of default.
A. Techniques Used to Reduce the Individual Lender's Risk
Banks have modified a number of lending techniques in order to re-
duce their individual risk. Significant changes have occurred in the
64. Dod, supra note 16, at 652;.4 U.S. Damper on World Recovery, supra note 13, at 126.
65. P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 41-42; see 1982 IMF EXCHANGE REPORT, supra note 62,
at 33-34.
66. Loan terms incompatible with LDC growth prospects have been a major contributor
to LDC deficit problems. See, e.g., P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 29, 35. Persistent deficits
and continual debt rollover indicate that if credit were withheld defaults would occur. Eg.,
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 60-61; see Aronson, supra note 24, at 352; see also Neu &
Greenig, Will anyone finance LDCs in the 1980sm, BANKERS' MAG. (London), Aug. 1981, at
38, 38-41.
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areas of risk analysis and exposure limits, syndicated loans and sub-
participations, loan terms, and the variety of lending instruments
available.
1. Risk Analysis and Exposure Limits
Risk analysis is used to assess a borrower's creditworthiness before a
bank extends credit. In addition, risk analysis is used to establish inter-
nal exposure limits on the total amounts a bank is willing to lend in
particular countries.
While banks always have engaged in risk analysis, several analytical
models recently have been developed to provide more accurate assess-
ments.67 These models take into account such factors as socio-political
circumstances, external debt positions, foreign reserves in relation to
imports, energy vulnerability, and the relative levels of exports and
imports.68
Even though risk analysis has improved over the past decade, the
reliability of the projections remains in doubt.6 9 One serious problem
is the dearth of information available on LDC economies. 70 Many
LDCs lack the administrative staff and expertise necessary to accumu-
late accurate data for the analysis of past and future economic trends.71
Perhaps the best information comes not from the LDCs, but rather
from international organizations whose functions include the monitor-
ing of LDC economies. 72 These organizations, however, often treat as
confidential the specific information necessary for refined analysis and
deny banks access to it.73
In addition, regional banks generally have neither the capacity nor
the resources to conduct sophisticated risk analysis.74 In the past they
have joined loan syndicates with larger banks and have relied on the
67. Anderson, More Models than Vogue Magazine, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1982, at 41.
68. Different risk analysis models have been developed by such entities as the U.S. Ex-
port-Import Bank, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, and the money-center banks.
Most banks and financial organizations have adopted variations of the major models or
formulated their own. See id; J. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANK REGULATION 35 (1978); A.
ANGELINI, M. ENG & F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL LENDING, RISK AND THE EUROMARKETS
124 (1979).
69. Gutmann, Assessing Rsk in the Third World, BANKERs' MAG. (London), Feb. 1981,
at 36, 36-37; Anderson, supra note 67.
70. See, e.g., Ipsen, supra note 55, at 58.
71. A. ANGELINI, M. ENG & F. LEEs, supra note 68, at 78 n.8.
72. Id at 78; . EATON & M. GERSovrrz, supra note 9, at 3;A Nightmare of Debt, supra
note 29, at Survey 92-93.
73'. Note, Responding to the Callfor Order in International Finance: Cooperation Between
the International Monetary Fund and Commercial Banks, 18 VA. J. INTL L. 445, 470-79
(1978).
74. See Ipsen, supra note 55, at 58, 62; Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6.
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loan managers' analyses.75 Since the larger banks have begun encoun-
tering difficulties with their LDC loans, however, regional banks have
been reluctant to rely on information provided by larger banks and
have been refusing to join new syndicates or refinance existing loans.76
As a partial solution to this informational gap, a number of larger
banks are forming an organization to collect and disseminate informa-
tion needed to perform risk analysis.77 These banks hope to encourage
continued lending by regional banks and prevent the crisis which could
occur if a large number of regional banks were to discontinue their
LDC lending.78
In addition to analyzing the credit worthiness of particular borrow-
ers, banks also reduce their risk with internal exposure limits, which
establish a maximum aggregate amount that will be lent in any one
country and thus diversify the group of borrowers whose loans are held
in that bank's portfolio.79 Since exposure limits are developed with the
use of risk analysis, they are only as accurate as the risk analysis itself.
In addition, if a bank allows its officers to exceed exposure limits, the
limits' effectiveness in encouraging prudent lending is compromised.
While risk analysis and exposure limits both are useful in establish-
ing prudent levels of LDC exposure, overly conservative use of these
techniques can be counterproductive. If banks set their limits at levels
which reduce loans to LDCs faster than the LDCs can adjust to the
reduction, the LDCs, unable to roll over enough of their loans, will
encounter payment problems.
2. Diversjfcation Through Syndications and Sub-participations
Banks reduce their individual risk in lending to LDCs through the
use of syndicated loans and sub-participations. These techniques allow
75. Ipsen, supra note 55, at 62-63; Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6.
76. See Ipsen, supra note 55, at 58, 62, 64-65; Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6.
77. Ipsen, supra note 55, at 58; Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6.
78. Ipsen, supra note 55, at 58, 62; Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6. This organization
may not sufficiently assuage the fears of the regional banks. See id., at 1, col. 6, 15, col. 1.
79. Internal exposure limits are established by banks as part of their internal lending
review procedures. The limits are based on data obtained from the bank's risk analysis.
Some banks' systems for generating exposure limits are described in A. ANGELINI, M. ENrG
& F. LEES, supra note 68, at 124-31. The United States Comptroller of the Currency has
interpreted federal statutes to impose a limitation on banks' exposure to individual public
sector borrowers in foreign countries. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976).
Congress currently is considering authorizing the Federal Reserve to establish exposure
limits on a country-by-country basis. These limits would vary with the country's ability to
repay its debt. Current regulations do not limit lending to individual countries but rather
require specific capital reserves for foreign loans. See generally, Corse & Nichols, supra note
56. The adoption of country exposure regulations would institutionalize present internal
exposure limit practices. Senators' Plan Urges Fed Be Given Power To Restrict U.S. Banks'
Lending Abroad, supra note 45, at 7, col. 2.
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banks to hold smaller shares of loans, or to distribute parts of loans
they hold, and thus reduce the size of the LDC loans in their portfolios.
Syndications divide a loan among a number of participating banks,
and thus spread the risk among the lenders and diversify the individual
banks' portfolios.80 The syndication is coordinated by a managing
bank which solicits commitments from banks that have expressed inter-
est in the loan.81 The management and commitment processes both
entail additional fees.82
From the borrower's point of view, the drawback of syndicated loans
is the increased cost of borrowing caused by additional fees and ex-
penses. 83 There are, however, a number of benefits, in addition to the
reduction of bank risk, which seem to offset the increased cost. These
include: increasing the pool of lenders by reducing participation
amounts, thereby allowing smaller banks to join the loan;84 and provid-
ing the borrower with the expertise of a managing bank which is hired
to organize the syndicated loan.85
Sub-participations are also used to divide up a large loan among a
number of banks. In a sub-participation, a bank holding a loan in its
portfolio will sell to one or more banks parts of the loan and the right
to receive the payments from it.86 Some sub-participations provide that
they can be resold to the selling bank if the borrower does not pay on
the loan, but most do not.87 Sub-participations usually are for short
terms and often involve loans that have been held by the selling bank
for a number of years and are close to being repaid.88 Disposal of part
of these loans allows the selling bank to free its capital base and obtain
new loans.89
While the sub-participation technique has its origins in the 1960's,
only recently has it gained respectability among the large banks.90 Its
popularity has increased because of the decline in the number of
smaller banks willing to participate directly in syndicated loans, which
80. See Johnson, Banks will go on lending to the LDCs, THE BANKER, Nov. 1981, at 27.
For further description of syndicated loans, see A. ANGELINI, M. ENG & F. LEES, supra note
55, at 86. See also Silkenat, supra note 45; Ryan, International Bank Loan Syndications and
Particoations, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 25 (R. Rendell ed. 1980). The syndica-
tion market is currently contracting due to the departure of regional banks from the credit
market. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. A. ANGELINI, M. ENG & F. LEES, supra note 68, at 86.
82. Id at 84, 87.
83. Id
84. See Witcher, supra note 55, at 1, col. 6.
85. Silkenat, supra note 56, at 90 n.8.
86. See generally A Boom in Broking Out Loans, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1982, at 39, 39-41.
87. Id at 41.
88. Id
89. Id at 39.
90. Id
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in turn has forced the larger banks to hold increased portions of the
syndicated loans they manage. 91 Thus, an active secondary market for
syndicated loan participations is being created.92
Even with its new-found popularity, sub-participation remains sensi-
tive and unpublicized, because banks do not want to give their borrow-
ers the impression that their loans are not worth retaining in the banks'
portfolios. 93 In addition, because of the relatively recent development
of this market, a number of legal issues concerning the banks' rights on
default remain unsolved.94
3. Adjustments to Lending Terms
Banks have made a number of adjustments to lending terms which
have shifted market risk from them to the LDC borrowers and have
increased the economic burden of LDCs' external debt. These changed
terms include floating interest rates, shortened maturities, and up front
fees.
Although fixed interest rate terms were common until the early
1970's, floating interest rates are now used in most LDC loans.95 These
terms shift the risk of interest rate fluctuation to the borrower. As a
result of this shift, the LDCs encountered large increases in the cost of
servicing their debts during the period of high interest rates in 1981 and
1982. Recently, however, interest rates have declined and eased some-
what the onerous effects of the variable rates.96
Shorter loan maturities reduce bank risk in two ways. First, by
shortening the time that the loan principal is outstanding, the overall
risk of loss to inflation and default is reduced. Second, shorter loan
maturities reduce the time that a bank is bound by the loan's interest
margin and thus reduce the risk of the loan's becoming relatively
unprofitable. 97
91. Seeid at 40, 41.
92. Id at 39.
93. Id at 40.
94. Id at 41.
95. Floating interest rates in LDC loans are calculated in two steps. First, a formula in
the loan agreement is used to arrive at the London Interbank Rate, the "LIBOR" or "base"
rate, for a given interest period. The "margin" or "spread," a percentage in excess of
LIBOR fixed by the loan contract, then is added to the base rate. Silkenat, supra note 56, at
94; see Mitchell & Wall, The Eurodollar Market: Loans and Bonds in INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCIAL LAw 53, 62 (R. Rendell ed. 1980). The average spread above LIBOR on LDC
loans between 1973 and 1981 ranged from approximately 0.8% to 1.6%. A Nightmare of
Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 77 (chart). As the LIBOR rate fluctuates to reflect banks'
increased capital costs, LDCs bear higher interest on their loans.
96. The interest rate for 3-month Eurodollar loans was 13.63% on December 31, 1981,
10.00% on October 27, 1982, and 9.38% on December 8, 1982. Facts and Figures,
EUROMONEY, Jan. 1983, at 136.
97. Bank profits on loans are determined by the margin fixed in the loan agreement. See,
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While banks have found shorter maturities attractive, they are one of
the major reasons many LDCs face severe problems in servicing their
debt. A significant part of LDC debt has been incurred in order to
finance economic development, which requires a long gestation pe-
riod.98 Shortened maturities on these loans do not provide LDC econ-
omies- sufficient time to use the borrowed development capital to
generate additional earnings to meet principal repayment schedules.
The result has been an increase in the number of LDCs requiring rene-
gotiations of their loans.99
Finally, banks also have reduced their lending risk by recovering
more of their costs and profits early in the loan term by charging new
and increased fees.1°° Syndicated loans are accompanied by various
"up front" charges, the more common of which are commitment, man-
agement, participation, and agent fees. 10' These fees are in addition to
interest and other charges normally involved in borrowing and are as-
sessed whenever a loan is rolled over or refinanced. 10 2 Their net effect
is to increase banks' immediate profits and LDCs' cost of borrowing. 103
It is difficult to determine whether the overall effect of these adjust-
ments in loan terms has resulted in net benefit or detriment to LDCs.
On the one hand, it can be argued that banks would not have contin-
ued to lend to LDCs without these adjustments in lending terms, and
that LDCs thus benefit from continued access to the private market.
Further, reduced risk and added profitability have increased the pool
of banks willing to lend.' °4 On the other hand, increased costs have
added significantly to the LDCs' debt burden. 05 In addition, unre-
strained access to private markets on these terms has been seen by some
e.g., EUington & Schiffman, After Polish Crisi, International Banks Seek Lower Risks,
Higher Interest Fees, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1982, at 34, col. I. While floating interest rates
reduce the risk to banks of increased cost of funds, profits on loans are not protected. Mar-
gins vary widely from loan to loan, creating for banks the risk of being bound to a long-term
loan at an uncompetitive margin rate. This risk can be reduced by lending over shorter
terms. See P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 46; see also Atkinson & Rowe, supra note 30, at 63.
98. C. HARDY, RESCHEDULING DEVELOPING-COUNTRY DEBTS, 1956-1980: LESSONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17-18, 45-48 (Overseas Development Council, Working Paper No.
1, 1982).
99. Id
100. See Johnson, supra note 80, at 29.
101. A. ANGELINI, M. ENG & F. LEES, supra note 68, at 87-88.
102. Id at 84.
103. See generally id. at 86.
104. Johnson, supra note 80, at 29;A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 77-78.
105. The Brandt Report stated that:
[The heart of the debt problem is that a very large proportion of funds are lent on
terms which are onerous for borrowers from the point of view of both the repayment
capacity of the projects they finance and the time debtor countries need to correct struc-
tural imbalances in their external accounts.
BRANDT REPORT, supra note 5, at 223. See also C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 17-18, 45-48.
Vol. 8:173, 1982
Trends in LDC Lending
as facilitating irresponsible policies on the part of both banks and
LDCs. 0 6
4. Innovative Debt Instruments
LDCs have not had ready access to the Eurobond market.10 7 Re-
cently, however, some middle income LDCs have been able to make
inroads into this market by offering innovative debt instruments. 08
These innovative LDC instruments, which include Euronotes, commer-
cial paper offerings, and floating rate notes, are characterized by such
features as variable interest rates, medium-term maturities, smaller face
amounts, and wide distribution among a broad variety of lenders.109
These types of debt are likely to become more common as fears of
bank overexposure increase. They have many of the benefits of syndi-
cated loans, plus the additional advantage of innovative features
designed to attract different types of lenders. 110 Their broader distribu-
tion, like that of syndicated loans, serves to spread the borrowing
among a greater number of lenders, including regional banks and non-
bank investors, and thus diversify the lenders' risk."'
B. Bank Techniques to Prevent Default
Banks also have adopted techniques which concentrate on the pre-
106. The irresponsibility lies in both banks' and LDCs' apparent disregard of LDCs'
inability to service or repay some loans, in order to generate short-term profits for the banks
and quick cash for the LDC governments. Adede, supra note 9, at 265-66; see Note, supra
note 32, at 319; Regulators Plan Tighter Control of Foreign Loans, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1983,
at 3, col. 1.
107. G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 89-91; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 44-47.
Eurobonds are bonds denominated and payable in Eurocurrency. See Mitchell & Wall,
supra note 95, at 55. Eurocurrencies are deposits denominated in currencies other than that
of the country in which they are deposited. Silkenat, supra note 56, at 89 n.4. Eurodollars,
i.e., dollar-denominated deposits abroad, account for approximately 70% of total Eurocur-
rency. Id at 89 n.5.
108. See generally Goodman & Worth, supra note 27, at 82-83.
109. Some examples of these instruments and their features are contained in Goodman
& Worth, supra note 27, at 82-83. See also Mitchell & Wall, supra note 95, at 56.
110. See Goodman & Worth, supra note 27, at 83.
111. Id at 78, 82-83. As with bonds, the risk of default on these instruments is borne by
their holders, which usually are more numerous than the participants in a syndicated loan.
Aspects of the protection of bondholders are discussed in Note, International Debt Obliga-
tions of Enterprises in Civil Law Countries: The Problem of Bondholder Representation, 21
VA. J. OF INT'L L. 269 (1981).
For example, Costa Rica has successfully entered the Euromarket by issuing floating rate
notes in smaller amounts than the usual participations in syndicated loans. Goodman &
Worth, supra note 27, at 78, 83. It has since sought to renegotiate its debts, and its notes
apparently have complicated the situation. The central issue is whether the notes should be
included as part of the renegotiation. .4 Nightmare of Debi, supra note 29, at Survey 28.
Some of the issues involved in renegotiating Eurobonds are discussed in Wood, Debt Pri-
orities in Sovereign Insolvency, INT'L FrN. L. Rv., Nov. 1982, at 4, 8.
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vention of default as a means of reducing risk. These techniques in-
clude loan renegotiation, conditionality, cross default arrangements,
and government influence.
1. Renegotiation
Loan renegotiation usually becomes necessary when a country's for-
eign reserves and export earnings are insufficient to cover the cost of
imports and debt service, placing the country on the verge of default. 11 2
To prevent default, creditors renegotiate the loan by providing addi-
tional loans or extending the time for repayment.
LDCs can attempt to renegotiate loans from any of their three
sources of credit: the IMF, governments, and banks.113 Renegotiation
can involve rescheduling and refinancing."t 4 Rescheduling entails ex-
tending a debtor's repayment schedule and is generally preferred by
government lenders." 5 Refinancing entails providing new loans to pay
off old ones and is preferred by banks because it allows them to earn
additional fees.' 16
When an LDC seeks to renegotiate its loans, it usually begins by
approaching the IMF.' 7 The IMF assists in evaluating the LDC's eco-
nomic problems and establishing a program of corrective policies
which usually includes access to the IMF's credit facilities.' 18 Govern-
ment and private creditors often insist on IMF involvement before they
agree to renegotiate an LDC's loans." 9
If necessary, the LDC then will approach its government creditors,
whose meetings on LDC payment problems have come to be known as
the Paris Club.120 Government lenders use what often is called the
"short leash" approach to renegotiation, which provides credit relief
112. See Cohen, Developing Country Debt Relief and Development Assistance, in ISSUES
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 149, 150-57 (W. Tyler
ed. 1977).
113. A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 41.
114. P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 36; D'Arista, Private Overseas Lending: Too Far, Too
Fast, in DEBT AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 57, 70-71 (J. Aronson ed. 1979).
115. P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 35-37.
116. G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 208-09; Note, supra note 32, at 307 n.10; P. DHONTE,
supra note 6, at 35-37.
117. See,4 Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 27.
118. Note, supra note 32, at 311, 321;A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 27.
See infra text accompanying notes 136-57 (IMF conditionality programs).
119. J. EATON & M. GERSOVITZ, supra note 8, at 36; Note, supra note 32, at 322; see
infra text accompanying notes 136-57.
120. See A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 27. The Paris Club and its
procedures are described in P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 35-37;, ANightmare of Debt, supra
note 29, at Survey 27. Some of the problems now facing the Paris Club are presented in
Ollard & Sington, The Unique Club of Michael Camdessus, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1982, at 52,
54.
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restricted as to both the loans which can be renegotiated and the peri-
ods for which they can be extended.1 2' This embodies the belief preva-
lent in developed countries that debt relief is not a proper form of
foreign aid, and that LDC loans should be viewed strictly in terms of a
commercial relationship.122 In addition, Paris Club members generally
insist that no other creditors receive more favorable terms than they,
and that renegotiation with bank creditors be pursued concurrently. 123
The last group of creditors to be approached generally will be the
banks. 124 Like the Paris Club, banks use the short leash approach and
therefore restrict the scope of renegotiation, preferring to reconvene if
settlements prove inadequate. 125 The renegotiation process used by
banks is unstructured, in part because of their desire to discourage its
use. 26 The problems this lack of structure fosters are exacerbated by
the sheer number of banks involved in any LDC renegotiation. 27
The initial decision in bank renegotiations is the selection of the
loans to be included in the process. 2 8 Three basic principles then
guide the renegotiations. First, the banks must reach approximate una-
nimity with respect to any final agreement. This is required by cross
default arrangements among creditors. 129 Second, in order to prevent
loans from becoming non-performing assets, postponement of interest
payments will rarely be permitted. 30 Third, because of conditions es-
121. G. ABBOTr, supra note 9, at 191-92; see C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 46.
122. C. HARDY, supra note 76, at 46-47; see G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 189-94, 249; P.
DHONTE, supra note 6, at 42.
123. Note, supra note 32, at 321 & n.93. For a discussion of such a "most favored debt
clause," see Wood, supra note 111, at 4.
124. See A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 27.
125. P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 40. Some problems with the short leash approach are
discussed in C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 46.
126. No formal debt renegotiation procedure includes the commercial banks. Multina-
tional financial institutions have been lending to sovereign debtors, including LDCs, since
World War II and have more experience with renegotiation than commercial creditors.
Note, supra note 32, at 307-08.
127. For example, the Polish renegotiations involved 501 banks. A Nightmare of Debt,
supra note 29, at Survey 27-28.
128. In deciding which loans to include in renegotiations, creditors must decide whether
short-, medium-, or long-term loans will be included, and in some cases whether bonds also
will be renegotiated. A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 28. A similar decision
must be made by the Paris Club members. C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 21.
129. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
130. 4 Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 28. This principle has been waived
partially in at least one case, that of Nicaragua. C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 34.
At the present time, LDC loans are carried on banks' balance sheets at their historic cost.
Because sometimes there is no realistic expectation that a given LDC loan will be repaid
fully, a more accurate appraisal of its value is the projected stream of future income it will
produce. Taylor, Accountingfor Rescheduled Loans, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1982, at 31, 33.
Reforms in bank accounting and disclosure practices regarding LDC loans currently are
being considered by federal regulators and Congress. Dizard, supra note 29, at 75; Regula-
tors Plan Tighter Control of Foreign Loans, supra note 106.
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tablished by the Paris Club, banks cannot obtain better terms than
Paris Club members when government loans also are being
renegotiated.13 1
To discourage renegotiation, government and bank creditors have
resisted formalizing renegotiation procedures.132 Because the payment
problems of LDCs often recur, however, ad hoc approaches to renego-
tiation serve only to compound the LDCs' difficulties. 33 In addition,
the insistence of government and bank creditors on restricting the scope
of the arrangements results in repeated renegotiations.134 As a result of
the restrictive and unstructured nature of this process, it is not uncom-
mon for loan renegotiations to begin shortly after, or even before,
agreement regarding prior years' debts has been reached. I3 5
2. Conditionality
Programs of conditionality impose economic austerity measures on
LDCs and thereby reduce the risk of default on their loans from
banks. 3 6 Under a program of conditionality, the IMF and the LDC
formulate and impose austerity measures after considering the LDC's
social, political, and economic circumstances. 37 These measures are
131. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 308, 330.
133. Ad hoc approaches to renegotiation often have been attacked as inefficient and dis-
ruptive. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Selected Issues Relating to the Establishment of Common
Norms in Future Debt Reorganizations at 3, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.2/9 (1977); G. ABBOTT,
supra note 9, at 234-37; Note, supra note 32, at 322-23.
134. G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 190-91.
135. See, e.g., Poland to Sign Accord Today to Delay Debt, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1982, at
39, col. 2. Banks have an incentive to renegotiate frequently because the process can be
quite profitable. See,4 Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 36; Note, supra note 28,
at 316 n.62.
136. The term "conditionality" appears to derive from the "conditions" which the IMF
may impose in granting access to its credit and assistance facilities. See J. GOLD, CONDI-
TIONALrrY (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as IMF Pamphlet No. 31].
The imposition of IMF conditionality programs was not supported by the banks until fairly
late in the 1970's. Until then, banks had tried to perform the IMF's function without enlist-
ing its aid. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 63; Note, supra note 73, at 453-54; Note,
supra note 32, at 319 & n.77; Payer, Commercial Banks and the IMF, MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR, Apr. 1980, at 3, 15. The IMF contends that the circumvention of its policies only
served to delay and frustrate necessary adjustments to the LDCs' economies. See IMF Pam-
phlet No. 31, supra, at 16; J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE
AW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 32, 1977).
137. In fact, there are two distinct levels of conditionality. Only the second level of
conditionality is of significance here.
First level conditionality does not require compliance with a program of economic per-
formance criteria. It is invoked when loans are made from special IMF credit facilities or
from a country's IMF reserves. When a borrower requests a stand-by agreement entitling it
to use resources in its first credit tranche (its first level of borrowing), it must submit a letter
of intent setting forth the economic policies it intends to pursue, and how access to IMF
facilities will further the implementation of these policies. Generally, approval of a first
tranche loan is automatic. Gold, Balance of Payments Transactions of the InternatIonal Mon-
190
Trends in LDC Lending
intended to correct the LDC's balance of payments deficit within a
specified time period-usually one to three years. The more commonly
used measures include: currency devaluation, restrictions on subsidy
programs and other government spending, modification of wage and
price controls, ceilings on expansion of credit by the central bank, and
limits on additional external borrowing. 38
Conditionality is imposed when an LDC seeks IMF assistance, either
voluntarily or at the insistence of its bank creditors. An LDC may vol-
untarily seek the assistance of the IMF in order to gain access to its
lending facilities, expertise, and influence with private lenders.139 The
LDC's agreement to adopt a program of conditionality is often a pre-
condition to gaining access to these facilities. 14' Alternatively, an
LDC's bank creditors may require that it seek IMF assistance and ac-
cept conditionality as a precondition to renegotiation or continued
lending. I41 By requiring IMF conditionality programs, banks enjoy the
benefits of the IMF's corrective policies, which improve an LDC's abil-
ity to service outstanding debt.' 42
In formulating a program of conditionality, the extent to which the
LDC's economy and balance of payments have deteriorated determines
the severity of the corrective measures. 143 The programs are intended
to be flexible, however, and can be modified if necessary. 144 If an LDC
fails to comply with an established program, access to IMF resources
will be discontinued until new consultations are completed and an
etary Fund in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 237, 242-44 (R. Rendell ed. 1980). For an
example of a stand-by agreement, see J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BY THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FuND 46 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 27, 1979) [hereinafter IMF Pam-
phlet No. 27].
The IMF has adopted guidelines strengthening the requirements of the first level of condi-
tionality because they were perceived to have been inappropriate for dealing with borrow-
ers' long-standing economic imbalances. Guitian, Fund conditionality and the international
adustmentprocess: the changing environment ofthe 1970%s, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1981, at 8, 11.
The IMF's rationale is the same as that put forth in opposition to continued bank lending to
LDCs: unrestricted bank loans, like IMF loans with little conditionality, allow LDCs to
delay adopting necessary economic adjustments. See id Moreover, because the first level of
conditionality does not require adjustments to the LDC's economy, it is unacceptable to
other creditors seeking to gain the benefit of IMF involvement in the country's payment
problems. Creditors generally insist that the borrower seek funds from the upper credit
tranches or from special facilities which require mandatory programs of conditionality. See
A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 29, at Survey 41.
138. Guitian, supra note 137, at 11; see also Kincaid, supra note 33, at 18-21.
139. Payer, supra note 136, at 15; Guitian, supra note 137, at 8-11.
140. IMF Pamphlet No. 27, supra note 137, at 19.
141. J. EATON & M. GERsovlTz, supra note 9, at 36; IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note
136, at 14.
142. Note, supra note 73, at 453.
143. IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 16.
144. See, e.g., Kincaid, supra note 33, at 18-21.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
agreement is reached.' 45 An LDC's loan agreements with its bank
creditors also may provide that non-compliance with an IMF program
would suspend further bank credit until a new arrangement is
reached. '46
Past experience has shown that conditionality imposes political, eco-
nomic, and social costs on the borrower. These costs can prove to be
too high for some LDCs.' 47 In some cases the LDC abandons the pro-
gram or attempts to circumvent the process by borrowing the needed
funds from private sources. 148 In such cases, because effective economic
adjustments are not made, the LDC's continuing deficits must be
financed by increasingly larger borrowings.149
If an LDC continues to finance its deficits without taking corrective
measures, it eventually will exhaust its credit and then will be forced to
turn to the IMF and other public lenders for assistance. 150 In the
meantime, the internal and external economic well-being of the LDC
may have deteriorated such that drastic remedial measures will be re-
quired. The IMF maintains that these measures often are more severe
than those which would have been necessary had IMF assistance been
requested in the first instance.' 5'
LDCs repeatedly have called on the IMF to relax conditionality be-
cause of its harsh effects on their citizens.' 52 This causes a dilemma for
the IMF and for LDCs with access to bank credit. On one hand, the
IMF encourages countries to seek its help as soon as balance of pay-
ments problems occur.1 53 If the more onerous requirements of condi-
tionality were to be relaxed, LDCs might be more willing to turn to the
IMF before their economic problems became critical. On the other
hand, conditionality now has become a strong link between LDCs and
both public and private creditors.' 54 If it is made more lenient, credi-
tors will incur greater risks in LDC lending, which will either increase
the cost of loans or decrease the amount of funds available to LDCs-
145. IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 25.
146. Id at 14.
147. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
148. Adede, supra note 9, at 243-46.
149. See id at 245.
150. IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 16; C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 42.
151. IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 16; C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 42.
152. For cases in which implementation of programs of conditionality has led to polit-
ical unrest, see Kincaid, supra note 33, at 18-21; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 66-67;
Solomon, supra note 9, at 344-46; Note, supra note 32, at 326-28. See generally IMF Pam-
phlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 14; C. HARDY, supra note 98, at 41-42,
153. See supra note 151.
154. See Note, supra note 73, at 453.
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funds which the IMF does not have the capacity to replace. 155
The IMF has not been totally unresponsive to LDCs, however. In
1979 its executive board adopted new guidelines aimed at relaxing
some aspects of conditionality. 156 Significant changes include: an in-
crease from one to as many as three years in the period within which
LDCs must meet the goals set in conditionality agreements; the estab-
lishment of a policy requiring greater consideration of a country's do-
mestic social and political objectives; a limitation of the conditions
imposed on the LDC to those absolutely necessary to meet the goals of
the agreement; and the adoption of improved procedures for reviewing
and modifying programs. 57 The movement toward less stringent con-
ditionality is likely to continue, despite the need for the program's posi-
tive effects on LDC lending.
3. Cross Default Clauses
Cross default clauses also are used to prevent default and now are
widely included in LDC loan agreements with public and private credi-
tors.158 A cross default clause usually provides that a default on any of
the LDC's loans constitutes an event of default under the loan contain-
ing the clause.' 59 As a result, should an LDC default on one of its
loans, any creditor having such a cross default clause in its loans could
declare them in default.
The effect of cross default arrangements, at least in theory, is to link
the LDC's loans together, so that it does not have the option of selec-
tively defaulting on any one loan and must treat all creditors on an
equal basis. A cross default arrangement thus holds as collateral the
LDC's ability to borrow by making too costly an LDC's default on any
one loan, if as a result it may be declared in default on all other loans
and thereby lose all its credit. 160
Should an event of default occur on a loan included in a cross de-
155. See IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at 15; STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 64
(benefits to private lenders).
156. IMF Decision No. 6056 (79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, reprinted in 1979 IMF ANNUAL RE-
PORT, at 136-38; see Guitian, supra note 137, at 11; IMF Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 136, at
15.
157. IMF Decision No. 6056, supra note 156.
158. See Silkenat, supra note 56, at 100; Logan, Term Loan Agreements, in INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 19 (R. Rendell, ed. 1980); Wickersham, Rescheduling of Sovereign
Bank Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Nov. 1982, at 8, 10.
159. Another cross default clause sometimes used creates an event of default on the loan
it governs, if an event of default (as opposed to a declared default) occurs on one of the
LDC's other loans. This type of cross default clause is not widely used because of its restric-
tiveness. See Carroll, The Worst Clause in the Euromarket, EUROMONEY, June 1981, at 90.
160. Cross default arrangements are used not only among private lenders, but also
among public and private lenders. In these cases, a default on a private loan could trigger
default on an IMF or government loan, or vice versa. Panel Discussion: Refinancing of Third
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fault arrangement, if the lender declares a default, it can precipitate a
race among creditors to set off or attach assets available to secure pay-
ment on their loans. Should a creditor choose instead to negotiate with
the LDC and not declare a default, it would sacrifice whatever priority
over assets it might have obtained. 61 In most cases a race to seize as-
sets would be counterproductive since it would cause all loans declared
in default to become due immediately and would close all lines of
credit to the LDC. In any event, there seldom would be enough assets
outside the LDC to satisfy fully all the creditors' claims. Renegotiation
is usually the only alternative which offers some chance of satisfying
most banks' claims.
Once a default has occurred, any creditor protected by a cross de-
fault clause could provoke a chain of defaults. As a result the terms of
any renegotiation could be disproportionately influenced by banks with
relatively smaller exposure whose interests might diverge from those of
banks with greater exposure. 62 Thus cross default clauses, while use-
ful in preventing selective default, could profoundly destabilize renego-
tiation should default occur.
4. Government Influence
Banks also use the influence of their governments to prevent default
by requesting them to pursue foreign policies intended to either assist
or threaten a troubled LDC. The means banks use to solicit govern-
mental cooperation range from informal contacts with legislators to
formal petitions for assistance from the political department in charge
of foreign affairs. 163 These approaches vary according to differences in
the structure of government and the governmental access provided spe-
cial interest groups.
The policies which banks may seek to have implemented also vary.
In some cases direct grants, reductions in trade barriers or other forms
World Debt, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 269, 278 (1978); see Note, supra note 73, at
456.
161. Wickersham, supra note 158, at 10; 4 Nightmare ofDebt, supra note 29, at Survey
35-37.
162. For example, a bank with several billion dollars at risk may be forced to follow the
hard line pursued by a bank with only a few million at risk. See Witcher, supra note 55, at
15, col. 1 (importance of regional bank's cooperation in averting Mexican default). Of
course, the extent to which a creditor is at risk will affect greatly its willingness to compro-
mise with its debtor. See, e.g., U.S. Bids Rumania Pay Overdue Grain Debt, supra note 34, at
DI, col. 1.
163. For example, informal bank contact influenced President Carter's decision to block
Iranian financial assets in the United States and abroad during the Iranian hostage crisis.
See Gordon & Lichtenstein, The Decision to Block Iranian Assets-Reexamined, 16 INT'L.
LAW. 161, 177-78 (1982). For an example of formal bank contact with the U.S. government,
see U.S. Bankers Urge Increase in IMF Capital, supra note 56, at 26, col. 3.
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of foreign aid are sought in order to stabilize an LDC's economy and
thereby ensure its continued creditworthiness. 164 In other cases, if an
LDC's government has become hostile or aloof toward its creditors,
banks may seek to have their governments threaten political or eco-
nomic sanctions if the LDC shirks its obligations. 65 The policies
which governments may adopt on banks' behalf can range from infor-
mal discussions with LDC governments to formal legislative acts.' 66
These interactions between banks and their governments pose diffi-
cult questions concerning their propriety. 67 To the extent that a gov-
ernment is unwilling to allow its banks to suffer major losses from LDC
lending and modifies its policies to reflect that concern, banks have sig-
nificant influence on the government's foreign policy. 68 Furthermore,
government assistance of this type may foster reckless banking prac-
tices by giving banks a false sense of security from the belief that the
government will "bail them out" by acting as a debt collector or by
providing emergency aid to the LDC.169
At the same time, however, the banks' ability to call on their govern-
ments for assistance undoubtedly provides them with confidence to
continue lending to debt-ridden LDCs. 170 To the degree that these new
loans are required to prevent default by LDCs on their outstanding
loans, the use of government influence by banks may be a necessary
evil.
164. The recent increase in IMF quotas, although indirect, is an example of how U.S.
governmental action in aiding LDCs has been enlisted by banks. Clark, Treasury's Donald
Regan Finds It Isn't Very Easy to Sell "Damaged' Goods, NAT'L J., Jan. 29, 1983, at 208, 211;
Madison, Out of the Closet, NAT'L J., Jan. 8, 1983, at 79. A similar example is the pledge by
central banks of the developed nations to stand behind their banks in crises. See, e.g., STAFF
REPORT, supra note 7, at 26.
165. The freeze of Iranian assets during the hostage crisis is an example of how U.S.
governmental action has been enlisted to punish borrowers. Legal Repercussions of the
Freezing of Iranian Assets and Loans, INT'L CURRENCY Rnv., Dec. 1980, at 27; Gordon &
Lichtenstein, supra note 163, at 177. Military force also has been used in some extreme
cases. Wood, supra note 111, at 5; see Strange, Debt and Default in the International Political
Economy, in DEBT AND THE LEss DEVELOPED CouNTRiE 7-26 (J. Aronson ed. 1979).
166. The relationship between banks and government is one of mutual dependence; gov-
ernments from time to time also have extracted concessions from banks. For example, the
governments of the U.S. and U.K. recently successfully requested that their banks continue
to lend to different countries. Bossing the Markets, supra note 26, at 9.
167. Issues arise both as to the effects of the relationship on the banks' governments, see
P. DHONTE, supra note 6, at 50, and as to the effects it has on the borrowing government, see
id; Panel Discussion: Refinancing of Third World Debt, supra note 160, at 279.
168. See e.g., Solomon, supra note 9, at 347-49; U.S. to Study Policy in Bid to Stabilize
World's Economies, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
169. G. JOHNSON, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET 23, 33
(IMF Occasional Paper No. 17, 1983).
170. Id at 31-35.
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III. Searching for Common Ground
As external financing of LDC balance of payments deficits has in-
creased, the long-term interests of the banks and LDCs have con-
verged. Banks now have considerable amounts of loans outstanding to
LDCs and are vulnerable to LDC economic crises. At the same time,
LDCs have become dependent upon continued bank credit to maintain
and enhance their economic development. Since LDC prosperity ulti-
mately depends on development, banks and LDCs have a common in-
terest in perpetuating the debtor-creditor relationship.
This relationship is not completely harmonious, however, and recent
trends in bank lending techniques are deepening the conflict. Natu-
rally, banks seek to maximize profits and minimize risk, while LDCs
seek to obtain funds on the most favorable terms possible. The more
difficult issue, however, arises from the central role that bank lending
now plays in LDC development. Capital for LDC development tradi-
tionally has come from export earnings or from grants and conces-
sional loans from public creditors. 17' The amount supplied by these
sources over the past decade, however, has not been adequate to meet
the LDCs' increasing needs. z72 Therefore, the LDCs have come to rely
on continued bank lending to supplement development capital.
Because the LDCs' balance of payments deficits originally were be-
lieved to be temporary, the provision of funds on commercial terms
seemed to be a suitable interim solution. As underdevelopment has
persisted, however, deficits have proven to be a long-term problem. By
diverting scarce development capital to pay for short-term loans, ex-
isting external debt has become an additional barrier to develop-
ment. 73 The bank-LDC relationship has begun to deteriorate as
economic recession and reduced LDC growth have persisted. Lending
techniques adopted in response to these conditions can either facilitate
bank lending and preserve the precarious relationship, or increase the
LDCs' debt burden and cause a catastrophic contraction of credit.
A. The Impact of New Lending Techniques
Some of the techniques that banks have adopted to diversify further
their LDC portfolios have proved beneficial to both banks and LDCs
without causing additional strains in their relationship and therefore
should be encouraged. The sales of syndication interests and sub-par-
171. G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 185; BRANDT REPORT, supra note 5, at 221-29.
172. See, e.g., BRANDT REPORT, supra note 5, at 224-25.
173. See, e.g., G. ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 187.
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ticipations in loans, together with the proliferation of innovative debt
instruments, have helped banks diversify by permitting smaller partici-
pation amounts and enlarging the pool of lenders. As a result, many
LDCs have been able to gain access to new and larger capital markets.
More accurate risk analysis and internal exposure limits also have
been positive additions to banks' lending techniques. They have pro-
vided necessary controls on lending, which in the long run benefit
banks by curtailing excessive lending risk and benefit LDCs by
preventing unmanageable debt burdens. If used too conservatively,
however, these techniques could complicate existing problems by caus-
ing an excessive contraction of credit for LDCs.
Banks' actions to influence their governments' policies have proven
beneficial by persuading certain developed countries to adopt foreign
policies more accurately reflecting the needs of LDCs. To the extent
that these foreign policies have helped stabilize the deteriorating econo-
mies of some LDCs, they protect the strategic interests of these devel-
oped countries and assist the LDCs.
Other lending techniques, however, have had extremely negative ef-
fects on the bank-LDC relationship. By tightening the terms on which
LDCs must borrow, banks have forced a diversion of funds from devel-
opment to the servicing of loans. In addition, the short leash approach
to renegotiation has resulted in inadequate settlements and perpetual
renegotiation. Finally, banks' emphasis on overly ambitious programs
of conditionality has hampered some LDCs' development by causing
economic and political disruption.
The diversion of capital caused by these lending techniques reduces
the LDCs' development base and limits their ability to correct deficits
and repay loans. A better approach would recognize the long-term re-
quirements of the development process and formulate a more flexible
relationship.
The changes in lending techniques are symptomatic of the severe
pressures on the bank-LDC relationship brought about by the signifi-
cant role banks now play in LDC development. Modification of those
techniques having a negative effect on the relationship may not be suffi-
cient to avert a crisis. Political and economic events beyond the control
of the LDCs threaten to overtake them and disrupt their credit relation-
ship with the banks. Longer-term solutions are needed to ensure the
continued viability of the relationship.
B. Long-Term Solutions
Banks should recognize the important role they play in LDC devel-
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opment and the detrimental effects their policies can have on it. In or-
der to maintain the LDCs' present development base, banks must
extend maturities on loans and renegotiation agreements to take into
account the protracted time required for LDC development and its vul-
nerability to world economic cycles. One solution would be to index
the maturities on large loans according to the growth in LDCs' GNP.
This would permit LDCs to service their debt at a pace commensurate
with the development of their economies and would keep development
from backsliding in times of economic weakness.
Haphazard and inefficient approaches to renegotiation must be
abandoned in favor of a more orderly process. One solution would be
to establish a neutral body to act as mediator in renegotiations between
LDCs and their creditors. A body such as the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes 174 could serve as such a media-
tor. The existence of a specialized forum would aid in the accumula-
tion of expertise and the development of efficient procedures. This
would minimize the disruptions and expense caused by renegotiations
and bring predictability to an otherwise uncertain process.
The flow of development capital from LDCs must be stemmed in
order to ensure an adequate development base. To this end, LDCs
must take steps to provide regional banks and non-bank creditors with
better information. Voluntary disclosure will help reestablish goodwill
and assist larger banks in attracting other lenders to the market. In
addition, LDCs should abandon ideological rhetoric calling for actions
inconsistent with their role as creditworthy debtors. 175 LDCs should
also seek to reduce their dependence on external debt by encouraging
foreign equity investment. To this end LDCs must implement foreign
investment policies consistent with the needs of private investors. De-
veloped countries and multinational organizations can assist in this
process by promoting investment treaties and other devices intended to
encourage and protect investors.176
Finally, the LDC development base must be diversified sufficiently
174. This institution was established under the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, entered into force October 14,
1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. See generally4 Survey ofArbl-
tral Forums: Their Signpicance and Procedure, 5 N.C.J. IN'L L. & COM. REG. 219, 237-42
(1980).
175. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 Special Session U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doec. A/9556
(1974); Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3202, id at 5.
176. One promising step in this direction is the present U.S. initiative to adopt bilateral
investment treaties with LDCs in order to encourage private sector investment.
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to protect it from volatile economic cycles. To accomplish this, LDCs
and developed countries should adopt policies aimed at encouraging
investments which enhance the LDC's development base, but do not
already represent a significant portion of its existing industry.
C. The Needfor a Long-term Perspective
The bank-LDC relationship is at a crucial juncture: commercial
banks, LDCs, and indeed the global financial system all depend on its
continued vitality. The only hope for a solution to the LDCs' dethcri-
sis lies in the elimination of their balance of payments deficits, which is
dependent in turn on their long-term economic development.
Many of the lending techniques adopted in response to the deepen-
ing financial crisis have increased the LDCs' debt burden and de-
creased the capital available to them, while others have helped to
maintain or enlarge the lending pool. Appraised in terms of their con-
tribution to LDCs' long-term economic development, lending tech-
niques insensitive to LDCs' economic situation may indeed retard the
growth necessary for the support of long-term economic development,
however much they may encourage lending by offering banks high
short-term profits. The ultimate stability of the world financial system
thus requires that banks assess their lending techniques not in terms of
their short-term attractiveness, but rather in terms of their effectiveness
in promoting LDCs' long-term economic growth.
